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Abstract
The stylised facts describing the poor performance of the youth labour market in Spain
over the last two decades, entailing high unemployment rates for both higher and lower
educated workers, over-education and low intensity of on-the-job training, are explained
through a simple matching model where higher educated workers crowd-out lower
educated ones from their traditional entry jobs. In this model, a combination of rigid
labour market institutions and an increase in the relative supply of higher educated
workers harms the training prospects of lower educated workers. ( 2000 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classixcation: J21; J23.
Keywords: Unemployment; Education; Training; Matching
1. Introduction
Spanish unemployment, besides being very high and persistent, is very un-
evenly distributed: female and youth unemployment rates have been about 10
and 20 percentage points higher, respectively, than the average unemployment
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rate, close to 20% since the mid-1980s. This fact constitutes a puzzle considering
that in the last 50 years there has been a very rapid educational upgrading which
has mostly a!ected precisely females and young workers.
The educational drive in Spain has taken place at a time when skill-biased
technological progress and increased global competition were leading to
a change in the industrial structure and a fall in the demand of lower educated
workers. However, in a companion paper (Dolado et al., 1999) we have argued
that both forces, on their own, cannot explain the various stylized facts which
have been observed in Spain. Indeed, in addition to the explanations just
mentioned above, we argued that there is the less familiar explanation of
&crowding out’ of workers with lower education by those with a higher educa-
tion. In some European countries, recent studies (see Muysken and Ter Weel
(1998) and the references therein) are rediscovering the old concept of
overeducation to explain unemployment di!erentials by educational levels.
Traditionally, job competition and crowding-out models stem from the exist-
ence of training ladders and a given amount of jobs with "xed characteristics
(see Thurow, 1975) or from situations when "rms "nd it costly to adjust wages
and thus react by increasing hiring standards instead (see Okun, 1981). An
alternative explanation for &crowding out’ could be given by standard search
theory (see Van Ours and Ridder, 1995). According to the latter, when it takes
time for workers and vacancies to "nd each other, a possible strategy for higher
educated workers is to accept a temporary unskilled job and to continue
searching for a skilled job paying a higher wage.
Five stylized facts characterise the performance of Spanish youth labour
market over the last two decades:
1. The rise of unemployment rates has been primarily concentrated in lower
educated workers but it has also taken place for higher educated ones.
2. The e!ects of educational attainments on the employment rate are not
particularly large. For instance, it is only after 30 years of age that workers
with a university degree have lower unemployment rates than workers with
high school or with a college diploma.
3. There is a dramatic downgrading in the entry-jobs market which a!ects
mainly the workers aged between 16 and 27 years of age and all educational
attainments. This downgrading seems to have harmed the employability of
workers with low levels of educational attainments.
4. There is a deceleration in the return to schooling (see e.g. Alba, 1993).
Relative wages for educated workers have, if anything, become stagnant over
the last decade.
5. The amount of on-the-job training provided by "rms to lower educated
workers is seemingly rather low. Thus, these workers hold entry jobs which
provide many less opportunities of promotion in the future than they used to
do in the past.
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1Both conditions are not at odds with the recent evolution of the Spanish labour market. The
liberalizarion of "xed-term jobs in 1984 has produced a drastic increase in the workers turnover rate
and, hence, a rise in the separation rate (see Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). Likewise, it is likely that
despite the declining density of the Spanish unions, their coverage has increased over the last two
decades. Finally, the coverage and generosity of unemployment bene"ts also increased throughout
the 1980s.
We address the issue of whether a matching model, as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (1994), with a non-segmented structure can
account for these facts. In our model there are two types of jobs (skilled and
unskilled) and two types of workers (higher and lower educated). We assume
that hires take place in a non-segmented labour market where higher educated
workers can perform unskilled jobs but less educated workers cannot perform
skilled jobs.
In Dolado et al. (1999) we use this model to explain issues 1}4 listed above.
We found that the model was able to explain these four stylized facts when
combined with increases in the separation rate, in non-working bene"ts and in
union power.1 In this paper, we concentrate on the "fth fact, namely that
regarding the consequences of crowding out on training. We argue that the
increase in the relative supply of educated workers has harmed the on-the-job
training prospects for less educated workers.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 documents the
stylized facts motivating the paper, Section 3 presents the theoretical framework,
and Section 4 contains some "nal remarks.
2. Facts
2.1. Educational attainments by age and gender
Starting in the 1960s from one of the lowest stocks of human capital in the
OECD (8% of the population aged 10}14 and 40% of those above 65 were
illiterate), Spain has experienced a remarkable improvement in the relative
supply of educated workers. An important characteristic of this process is that
the emphasis has been towards higher educational levels (essentially univer-
sity/tertiary degrees) and that, to a large extent, it has been reinforced by
a steady rise in the female demand for formal education.
These features are illustrated in the three panels of Table 1. In panel (a) there is
a comparison of educational attainments of population aged 25}64 in Spain and
the OECD, as of 1995. While Spain has one of the largest shares of population
with at most upper secondary education, the youngest cohorts (25}34 years of
age) are between twice and four times more educated than older cohorts. Panel
(b) shows how this higher education is mostly concentrated on female workers,
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Table 1
Education and unemployment in Spain
Panel (a). Educational attainment by age group
25}64 years 25}34/35}44 years 25}34/45}54 years 25}34/55}64 years
US! U! US U US U US U
Spain 28 16 1.5 1.5 2.6 2.5 4.7 4.5
OECD 60 22 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.9
Panel (b). Educational attainment of school leavers among population aged 16}29 years
Males Females
LS! U LS U
Spain 44 25 23 39
OECD 36 23 31 26
Panel (c). Unemployment rates (%) by age and educational attainment
20}24 years of age 25}29 years of age 29}64 years of age
LS US U LS US U LS US U
Spain 37.4 41.0 53.1 32.3 27.0 33.2 20.6 18.5 13.5
OECD 21.9 15.5 15.3 16.9 9.8 8.5 10.1 7.0 4.0
!LS: lower secondary or less, US: upper secondary, U: university.
Notes: Column 1 of panel (a) gives the proportion (in %) of population 25}64 years of age who have
completed at least upper secondary or university education. The remaining columns give the ratios
between these proportions for di!erent age cohorts (Source: OECD, 1997). Panel (b) gives the
proportion (in %) of the population of school leavers with lower secondary education or less and
university education (Source: OECD, 1998). Panel (c): Source: OECD (1997).
contrary to what happens in the OECD. Finally, panel (c) shows unemployment
rates by age and educational attainments. It can be observed that the standard
negative relationship between education and unemployment in the OECD is
less pronounced in Spain. Notwithstanding, the evolution of unemployment
between 1977 and 1998 is more unfavorable for workers with lower secondary
education } a rise from 2% (3%) to 17% (32%) for 25}39 aged male (female)
workers, than for those with a university degree } a rise from 2% (3%) to
13% (21%) for the same age cohort.
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2Similar "ndings also apply to female workers (see Dolado et al., 1999).
2.2. Entry jobs
Over the last two decades, there is a tendency towards the less skilled jobs
being occupied by the more educated workers. We illustrate this phenomenon
by making use of the occupational structure of the so-called &entry-jobs’ into the
labour market, namely the type of jobs that youth workers take after completing
a given educational level and which are supposed to provide training and
promotion possibilities in the future. For that purpose, four age groups and four
educational levels have been chosen in such a way that it allows us to describe
the kind of job that young workers were occupying up to four years since they
"nished their studies. Hence, the 16}20 cohort corresponds to compulsory lower
education, 18}22 to upper secondary education, 21}25 to college diploma
and 23}27 to university degree. As regards occupations, we consider
Professionals/Technicals (P1); Teaching Professionals and Employees in
Public Administration (P2); Clericals and Administratives (P3); Manual Crafts
and Operators (P4), and Sales Elementary and Hotel & Restaurant Occupa-
tions, Unskilled Services and Labourers (P5). The "ve occupations have been
ranked in decreasing order of skill requirements for the job. The inclusion of P2
is justi"ed since accession to Public Administration, through several types of
competitions, has been a traditional &entry job’ for Spanish youth workers, either
with a high or an intermediate level of education.
For the three main occupational groups described above, and for age cohorts
and educational attainments, Fig. 1 plots the proportion of the corresponding
occupation in male employment (dotted lines) and the proportion of male wage
earners with a given age and educational attainment who work in a certain
occupation (solid lines). The lesson to be drawn from this "gure is that the more
educated workers seem to be increasingly "lling both the more skilled jobs (P1)
and the semi-skilled ones (P3). This process is taking place at the expense of
a drastic reduction in P2, possibly due to the ageing of the Public Administra-
tion employees and/or the lack of hiring of young workers. At the same time the
less educated workers have been crowded out from their traditional &entry-jobs’,
namely semi-skilled jobs (P3) towards those jobs that hardly o!er any training
and require no educational quali"cations (P5).2
2.3. Overeducation and training
One possibility could be that the IT revolution has changed so much the
education requirements of the occupations we have considered that both
overeducation and crowding-out of low-educated workers are only apparent
phenomena. We look at workers’ perception of educational requirements for
5
Fig. 1. Entry jobs by age and education, men (1977}1998).
6
Table 2
Overeducation and training in Spain
Ed. Att./Occup. P1 P2 P3 P4 & P5
O! U! O U O U O U
(a) Workers’ perception of over- and underquali"cation (%)
Lower education 33.3 66.7 16.7 44.4 12.5 66.7 34.2 31.6
Secondary education 23.1 46.2 41.2 23.5 17.6 49.0 55.0 23.3
Vocational training 15.6 71.9 27.0 40.5 15.0 68.3 53.0 33.9
Tert./univ. education 23.5 69.1 25.3 60.0 74.5 21.3 80.0 10.0
(b) Workers receiving on-the-job training (%)
Lower education 0 40 33.3 13
Secondary education 33.3 33.3 47.6 9.1
Vocational training 68.6 28.6 33.3 27
Tert./univ. education 50.0 25 22.2 11.1
!O: overquali"ed, U: underquali"ed. Source: EUROSTAT Household Panel Survey.
a given occupation First, panel (a) of Table 2 shows the proportion of workers
under 30 years of age who declare to be overquali"ed in their current jobs. When
we distinguish by educational attaintment and occupation, the proportion of
workers in P3 with tertiary/university education who declare to be overquali"ed
is close to 75%, while most workers with lower educational attaintments declare
to be underquali"ed. Indeed, the pattern of responses for P3 is di!erent from
those pertaining to the remaining occupations where under- and overquali"ca-
tion hold for P1 and P2 and for P4 and P5, respectively. This seems to indicate
that higher educated workers do have enough human capital to hold P3 jobs,
whereas less educated workers do not and thus speci"c training is needed.
Without past observations on workers’ perceptions of jobs’ educational require-
ments, we cannot be sure about recent trends in overeducation stemming from
the IT revolution. However, it seems clear that a signi"cant proportion of higher
educated workers in semi-skilled jobs declared themselves to be overquali"ed
for those jobs.
As regards training, a few words about how it is provided in Spain are in
order. In general, there are school-based and workplace-based systems, the
latter either based on "rm skill formation or on government-led programs (see
OECD, 1998). The Spanish system is mainly school-based and relies on em-
ployer subsidies or tax relief conditional on work-place training through special
training/apprenticeship systems aimed at youth. However, apprenticeship em-
ployment contracts only accounted for 12% of youth employment in 1995 given
the high incidence of "xed-term employment contracts which do not involve any
explicit training altogether (see Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). Moreover, despite
7
3 It departs from other models in the search literature with heterogeneous workers (see for
instance, Brunello, 1996; Saint-Paul, 1996; Acemoglu, 1997; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998) by
assuming that the markets are non-segmented by skills, so that educated workers can be employed
in unskilled jobs. In an independent work, Gautier (1999) uses a somewhat similar model to discuss
under which conditions low-skilled workers are harmed by competition from skilled workers.
4Given the very rapid increase in subsidies for tertiary education which took place in Spain since
the early 1980s, this seems an acceptable assumption.
generous incentives to convert "xed-term into permanent contracts, only 12%
of training contracts and 28% of apprenticeship contracts were so converted in
1997. Panel (b) of Table 2 gives the proportion of workers whose training has
been provided and paid by the "rm, broken down by the worker’s educational
attaintment and occupation, as reported by the European Household Panel
Survey (HPS). It is noteworthy that this fraction in P3 is highest for workers
with upper-secondary education and lowest for workers with tertiary/university
education. Indeed, though not reported here for the sake of brevity, we "nd,
using individual data from the HPS, that the probability that a higher educated
worker occupies a job in P3 increases with the regional unemployment rates of
educated worker and the minimum wages set for those occupations by the
provincial/sectoral collective wage bargaining agreements (see Dolado et al.,
1997). Moreover, less training for lower educated workers is provided when
employment conditions are set by collective bargaining agreements at the
industry level than when employment conditions are set by "rm level collective
agreements.
3. A matching model
To account for overeducation, training and crowding-out, we consider
a simple matching model with two types of workers } educated and non-
educated, two types of jobs } skilled and unskilled, and on-the-job search for
educated workers employed in unskilled jobs.3 There is a continuum of "rms.
Unskilled jobs do not require any schooling but skilled jobs can only be "lled by
educated workers, who also can take unskilled jobs. The supply of non-educated
and educated workers is exogenously given and equal to ‚
1
and ‚
2
, respectively
(i"‚
2
/‚
1
is the ratio of educated to non-educated workers).4 Training in the
"rm is required for non-educated workers and is not a substitute for schooling.
Firms post vacancies for unskilled and skilled jobs. Educated workers will
accept o!ers for unskilled jobs if they do not have o!ers for skilled jobs and the
value from being employed in an unskilled job is larger than the valued of being
unemployed. Firms will hire educated workers for unskilled jobs as this implies
saving of the training costs required for non-educated workers. Firms do not
discriminate against educated workers occupying unskilled jobs (there is no bad
8
5We are assuming that on-the-job search of educated workers in unskilled jobs is as e$cient as
the search of unemployed educated workers.
signal in an educated worker taking unskilled jobs) and, in equilibrium, will be
indi!erent between hiring any type of worker for unskilled jobs.
3.1. Matching
Hires are given by matching functions which take the number of searchers
and job vacancies as arguments. Educated workers search for skilled jobs and
"ll them according to the matching function H
2
"m(u
2
‚
2
#e2
1
‚
2
, v
2
‚
2
),
where H
2
is the number of hires of educated workers for skilled jobs, u
2
is the
unemployment rate of educated workers, e2
1
is the proportion of educated
workers employed in unskilled jobs who are also assumed to be searching
for skilled jobs, v
2
is the vacancy rate of skilled jobs (measured with respect
to ‚
2
), and m is a constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) matching function with
m
1
,m
2
’0.5 Unemployed educated workers also match with unskilled job
vacancies. Given the matching function for skilled jobs, the number of hires of
educated workers for unskilled jobs is H2
1
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1
is the vacancy rate of un-
skilled jobs (measured with respect to ‚
1
). Finally, for non-educated workers,
the number of hires is H
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being the unemploy-
ment rate of non-educated workers.
Given the matching process, the probabilities of "lling vacancies are given by:
f For a skilled job: q
2
"H
2
/v
2
‚
2
, which under the CRS assumption can be
written as q
2
"m(h
2
), with h
2
"v
2
/(u
2
#e2
1
).
f For unskilled jobs: q
1
"(H
1
#H2
1
)/v
1
‚
1
, which under the same assumption
is equal to q
1
"m(h
1
)!(iu
2
/v
1
)h
2
q
2
, with h
1
"v
1
/(u
1
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).
As for workers, the rates at which they receive job o!ers are
f Skilled job o!ers for educated workers (either unemployed or employed in
unskilled jobs), q
2
"h
2
q
2
.
f Unskilled job o!ers for educated workers, q2
1
"h
12
m(h
12
)!h
2
q
2
, with
h
12
"(v
1
#iv
2
)/iu
2
.
f Unskilled job o!ers for non-educated workers, q
1
"((u
1
#iu
2
)/u
1
)h
1
m(h
1
)!
(iu
2
/u
1
)h
12
m(h
12
).
Thus, as the skilled jobs market gets tighter (h
2
increases), the proportion of
educated workers moving to unskilled jobs decreases, and the proportion of
non-educated workers "nding unskilled jobs increases.
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6This assumption is consistent with the matching process speci"ed above and, moreover,
guarantees an interior solution for u
1
and u
2
.
3.2. Steady-state equilibrium
In the steady-state equilibrium, the #ow out of unemployment and the #ow
into unemployment are equal for both types of workers and the #ow of educated
workers into unskilled employment must be equal to the #ow of educated
workers out of unskilled employment toward unemployment or to skilled
employment. Thus, we have: s
1
NE
1
"q
1
NU
1
, s
2
NE
2
"(h
2
q
2
#q2
1
)NU
2
, and
(s
1
#h
2
q
2
)NE1
2
"q2
1
NU
2
where NE
i
(NU
i
) is the number of employed (unemployed)
workers of type i (i"1,2), s
i
is the separation rate for jobs of type i, and NE1
2
is
the number of educated workers in unskilled jobs. Hence, the steady-state
unemployment rate for each non-educated worker is
u
1
" s1
s
1
#q
1
, (1)
the steady-state unemployment rate of educated workers is
u
2
" s2
s
2
#h
12
m(h
12
)
(2)
and the proportion of educated workers in unskilled jobs is
e2
1
" s2
s
1
#h
2
q(h
2
)
!s2#h2q(h2 )
s
1
#h
2
q(h
2
)
u
2
. (3)
3.3. The supply of vacancies
For the determination of the supply of vacancies, we follow Pissarides (1990).
Let <
i
be the returns to opening a job position of type i (i"1,2), J
i
the asset
value of a job of type i "lled by a worker of type i, and J2
1
the value of an
unskilled job "lled by an educated worker. Assuming that J
1
"J2
1
we have
that6
r<
1
"!c
1
#q
1
(J
1
!<
1
), (4)
while for skilled jobs
r<
2
"!c
2
#q
2
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2
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2
). (5)
The asset values of a "lled job, in turn, are given by
rJ
1
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1
),
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2
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7Note that the quit rate is the same one that we have assumed for the rest of the job matches, s
1
,
plus the probability of receiving a skilled job o!er for the educated worker employed in unskilled
jobs, which is equal to h
2
q
2
.
8Under the assumption that the training costs are distributed uniformly between 0 and 1 (the
value which we will assume for y
1
, for normalization), t can be interpreted as the proportion of "rms
training non-educated workers.
where r is the rate of interest, c
i
is the cost of keeping a job vacancy of type
i un"lled, y
i
is the output produced by a worker of type i in a job of the same
type, w
i
is the wage paid to workers of type i, and t is the training cost for
unskilled workers; while for unskilled jobs "lled by educated workers7
rJ2
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"y
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#h
2
q
2
)(<
1
!J2
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).
In equilibrium, all pro"ts opportunities from o!ering new jobs are exploited
so that <
1
"<
2
"0, and, hence,
J
1
"y1!w1!t
r#s
1
, J
2
"y1!w2
r#s
2
, J2
1
" y1!w1
r#s
1
#h
2
q
2
. (6)
As for wages, we assume that for educated workers they are equal to a propor-
tion b of the total surplus generated by the match, unless outside options of the
"rm and of the worker are binding (see Acemoglu, 1995) and that these options
are not binding, while for non-educated workers we will assume that the outside
option of the workers is binding, z being the reservation wage of non-educated
workers. Thus,
w
1
"z, w
2
"by
2
. (7)
From Eqs. (4)}(6), after substituting for wages, we get the conditions which
represent the supply of vacancies:
(1!b)y
2
q
2
"c
2
(r#s
2
), (8)
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!z)q
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1
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2
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), (9)
and for the training costs which make "rms indi!erent between hiring educated
or non-educated workers for unskilled jobs
t" h2q2
r#s
1
#h
2
q
2
(y
1
!z). (10)
Thus, as the skilled job market is less tighter and the separation rate in the
unskilled job market increases, the training costs which make "rms indi!erent
between training non-educated workers and hiring educated ones, falls, which
means that less "rms are eager to supply on-the-job training.8
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Table 3
Numerical simulations
Parameter values: y
1
"1, y
2
"2, c
1
"0.25, c
2
"2, a"0.5, r"0.03
s
1
"0.27, s
2
"0.18, b"0.85, z"0.7 s
1
"0.3, s
2
"0.2, b"0.9, z"0.8
i"0.1 i"1 i"1
u
1
(%) 19.8 28.7 32.6
u
2
(%) 1.1 6.0 8.0
u (%) 18.1 17.3 20.3
e2
1
(%) 17.3 12.8 20.2
t (%) 21.1 21.1 11.4
3.4. Simulations
Given a plausible functional form for the matching function, the model is too
complex to be solved analytically. Thus, we proceed as follows. We assume
a Cobb}Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale, which seems
to "t well the evidence on labour market #ows (see Blanchard and Diamond,
1989) and gives rise to the following probabilities:
q
1
"m(h
1
)"h~a
1
, m(h
12
)"h~a
12
, q
2
"m(h
2
)"h~a
2
,
where a’0 is the elasticity of hires with respect to job searchers. Given the
exogenous variables (a, r, s
1
, s
2
, b, z, i, y
1
, y
2
,c
1
and c
2
), Eq. (8) determines
h
2
and then, Eq. (9) determines q
1
, while Eq. (10) determines t. Given q
1
and h
2
,
Eqs. (1)}(3), together with the de"nition of q
1
, determine u
1
, u
2
, v
1
, v
2
, e2
1
.
We illustrate the implications of the model by means of numerical simulations
(Table 3). The parameter values that we used correspond, with some variations,
to those used by Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) in their calibration of unem-
ployment in a representative &European economy’. In particular, we increase the
replacement rate, z, to be 0.5, and decrease the separation rate to be 0.3 and 0.1
for unskilled and skilled jobs, respectively. Moreover, y
2
is assumed to be the
double of y
1
, and i is taken to be 1, namely that 50% of the labour force is
educated. It should be noted that we do not try to calibrate the model to yield
&realistic’ values for the endogenous variables (the model is too simple for that
task). We rather aim at evaluating the qualitative implications of the model. The
"rst column of Table 3 gives the results for this baseline case: the unemployment
rates of non-educated and educated workers are 28.1 and 2.5%, respectively,
while 17.3% of educated workers are employed in unskilled jobs, and the
training cost threshold is about 0.21. In the second column of the table it can be
observed that an increase in the relative supply of educated workers, increases
both unemployment rates, decreases the proportion of educated workers em-
ployed in unskilled jobs but does not a!ect the training cost threshold. Finally,
12
the third column shows that as separation rates of both types of jobs increase
and the bargaining power of educated and the reservation wage of lower
educated workers rise, then the unemployment rates of both types of workers
increase, the proportion of educated workers employed in unskilled jobs also
rises and there are fewer "rms willing to supply on-the-job training, in agree-
ment with the stylized facts discussed above.
4. Concluding remarks
The causes of unemployment of less-educated workers have relevant welfare
and policy implications. From a welfare viewpoint, overeducation and
crowding-out of less educated workers can never be a "rst best solution since
potential productivity is not used. In this case, it can be argued that policy-
makers should stimulate job creation at the top segment of the labour market.
However, if any of the other more traditional explanations also count, then
policy-makers could better directly focus at the bottom segment of the labour
market, for example by introducing subsidies for low-wage jobs. Finally, a con-
ventional wisdom is that when there is crowding-out, there is no need for extra
education of low-skilled workers since those workers would occupy unskilled
jobs, anyway. Thus, according to the above analysis, an increase in the educa-
tional attaintment of the labour force does not always solve the unemployment
problem unless other labour market rigidities are reduced.
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